State v. Clyne Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 44953 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-24-2017
State v. Clyne Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44953
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation




State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8701





IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 44953
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR-MD-2016-4995
v. )
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Heath Clyne contends the district court abused its discretion by not retaining jurisdiction
when it imposed his sentence.  Specifically, he asserts that the district court failed to appreciate
the full scope of its discretion when it recognized Mr. Clyne’s potential to be successful on
probation if proper treatment were provided to help him avoid a relapse to drug use, but then
refused to retain jurisdiction, which would have provided that sort of treatment, based on its
mistaken belief that the rider program only serves to identify a person’s issues.  Because the
district court refused to retain jurisdiction without an accurate understanding of what the rider
program actually offers, it abused its discretion.  Therefore, this Court should vacate that
decision and remand this case for a new sentencing hearing.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Clyne pled guilty to driving under the influence.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.37, Ls.14-24.)1  At the initial sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that
Mr. Clyne’s issues in this case were mostly related to his mental health issues, which were
exacerbated by his relapse to drug use.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.65, Ls.23-25.)  The district court
acknowledged that, when Mr. Clyne was able to stay on his medications, he has done well in
conforming his behavior to expectations.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.69, L.25 - p.70, L.2.)
Specifically, Mr. Clyne’s mental health issues included schizoaffective disorder (bipolar
type), an “other specified personality disorder with borderline and antisocial features,” and a
rule-out diagnosis for post-traumatic stress disorder, along with alcohol use disorder, an
amphetamine use disorder in remission, and a rule-out cannabis use disorder.  (Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinafter,  PSI),  p.36.)   As  a  result  of  this  new  dual  diagnosis,  the
psychological evaluation recommended long term treatment and behavior therapy.  (PSI, p.37.)
In light of those issues, the district court decided to continue the sentencing hearing so
Mr. Clyne could be screened for mental health court.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.70, Ls.11-14.)  However, the
mental health court personnel ultimately decided not to screen Mr. Clyne because he had been
involved in a physical altercation with another mental health court participant while in jail and
because he had sued one of their probation officers.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.6, L.24 - p.7, L.2; see also
Tr., Vol.1, p.74, Ls.4-6 (the district court indicating it had discussed the matter with the mental
health court judge and the decision to not screen Mr. Clyne would stand).)  Despite that, defense
1 The transcripts in this case are provided in two independently bound and paginated volumes.
To avoid confusion, “Vol.1” will refer to the volume containing, among others, the entry of plea
hearing held on July 19, 2016, and the continued sentencing hearing held on March 14, 2017.
“Vol.2” will refer to the volume containing the continued sentencing hearings held on
February 14, 2017, and March 7, 2017.
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counsel pointed out that Mr. Clyne was still capable of rehabilitation.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.76,
L.10 - p.77, L.8.)  The GAIN-I evaluation had, for example, recommended outpatient treatment.
(PSI, p.46.)  Mr. Clyne also had earned his GED and has employable skills.  (PSI, pp.17, 26.)
Accordingly, defense counsel recommended the district court retain jurisdiction, or alternatively,
impose  a  sentence  with  a  short  fixed  term,  so  as  to  make  Mr.  Clyne  eligible  for  parole  more
quickly, so as to timely effectuate that rehabilitation process.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.77, Ls.9-12.)
The district court again acknowledged Mr. Clyne’s ability to be successful on probation,
as “for some period of time while you were on parole, you were doing okay.  You were working,
apparently paying your bills.”  (Tr., Vol.1, p.79, L.22 - p.80, L.2.)  However, it was concerned
about the fact that Mr. Clyne kept relapsing back to alcohol and drug use:  “And then you went
to drinking again.  And that’s the issue with you, Mr. Clyne, is you get off the wagon, then you
quit taking your meds, and then you get delusional, and they you get in trouble.  That’s kind of a
recurring  pattern.   And  I’m  not  sure  how  to  break  it.”   (Tr.,  Vol.1,  p.80,  Ls.3-8.)   Despite  its
uncertainty as to how to break that cycle and make Mr. Clyne more able to succeed on probation,
the district court refused to retain jurisdiction to allow Mr. Clyne to participate in a rider program
because “we know what your issues are,” and so “I don’t believe that a rider is going to
accomplish more for you.”  (Tr., Vol.1, p.80, Ls.22-24.)  Instead, it imposed a unified sentence
of ten years, with one and one-half years fixed.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.81, L.23 - p.82, L.1.)




Whether the district court abused its discretion when it refused to retain jurisdiction over
Mr. Clyne’s case.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Refused To Retain Jurisdiction Over
Mr. Clyne’s Case
The  decision  to  not  retain  jurisdiction  is  reviewed  for  an  abuse  of  discretion.
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567 (Ct. App. 1982).  In order to properly exercise its discretion,
the district court must recognize the issue as one of discretion, act within the outer boundaries of
that discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards, and reach its decision in an
exercise of reason. See State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).  When the district court acts
without appreciating the full scope of its discretion, it abuses of its discretion. See, e.g.,
State v. Villavicencio, 159 Idaho 430, 437-38 (Ct. App. 2015).
Here, the district court failed to appreciate the full scope of its discretion in retaining
jurisdiction because it did not recognize the full scope of what the period of jurisdiction would
entail.  The district court refused to retain jurisdiction because “we know what your issues are.”
(Tr., Vol.1, p.80, Ls.22-24.)  That is an erroneously-narrow understanding of what the rider
program offers.  Rather, “[t]he primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable
the trial court to gain additional information regarding the defendant’s rehabilitative potential
and suitability for probation.” State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911, 915 (Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis
added).  Accordingly, the rider program provides more than just an evaluation of the defendant’s
issues; it provides “rehabilitative treatment and education with the goal of enabling the offender
to become successful on probation.” Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 149 Idaho 59,
61 n.1 (Ct. App. 2010); see I.C. § 19-2601(4).  Therefore, the rider program would have
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provided Mr. Clyne with additional treatment and education designed to help him become more
able to be successful on probation, such as helping him learn new or additional skills which he
could use to prevent a similar relapse from occurring this time around.
Basically, the rider program would have addressed the very point the district court
remained uncertain about in this case:
[F]or some period of time while you were on parole, you were doing okay.
You were working, apparently paying your bills.
And then you went to drinking again.  And that’s the issue with you,
Mr. Clyne, is you get off the wagon, then you quit taking your meds, and then you
get delusional, and they you get in trouble.  That’s kind of a recurring pattern.
And I’m not sure how to break it.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.79, L.24 - p.80, L.8 (emphasis added).)  Thus, the district court’s decision to forego
a treatment option based on its misunderstanding of what that treatment option actually provided
demonstrates that it acted without understanding the full scope of its discretion.
That abuse of discretion is particularly troubling given the district court’s recognition
that,  with appropriate treatment,  Mr. Clyne could likely be successful on probation.  (See, e.g.,
Tr., Vol.1, p.79, L.22 - p.80, L.2 (noting Mr. Clyne’s success on parole prior to relapsing).)
Essentially,  as  a  result  of  its  failure  to  appreciate  the  full  scope  of  its  discretion,  the  district
court’s sentencing decision fails to serve the goals of rehabilitation and protection of society.
See State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993) (reiterating that these are two of the goals of
sentencing and that protection of society is the primary of those goals); State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho
236, 240 (1971) (indicating that rehabilitation should be the first means the district court
considers to achieve the goals of sentencing), superseded on other grounds as stated in
State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).
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Since the district court acted without appreciating the full scope of what its discretion
entailed,  of  what  options  were  available  to  it,  it  abused  its  discretion  by  refusing  to  retain
jurisdiction over Mr. Clyne.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Clyne respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand this case for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 24th day of October, 2017.
___________/s/______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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